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panies of America and, as a matter of fact, Project Gasoline was initially begun by one of the major coal producers of America. So there is a great deal of research, a lot of which has been encouraged by the Federal Government. May I say to the gentleman that in addition to the research projects, coal mined by automation has attempted to make itself more competitive. The price of coal today is less per ton than it was in 1947. All of the factors along the line economically with respect to coal have been rather stable, but when we continually lose great market areas such as New England—and I for one would not for 1 minute say that we have to turn all of New England back to the private domain of coal; I do not suggest that at all but simply say in my remarks we ought to have a level which this should not go beyond. In other words, the continual raiding of markets, no matter how swift our research might be or how vastly improved automation in the mining of coal becomes, makes it hard for us to keep pace when they take the markets away from us in such an unfair competitive situation.

Mr. WHARTON. Then, the gentleman would say these programs are definitely worthwhile in making the statement from your own personal experience?

Mr. MOORE. With respect to research, I hold out great hope for the fact that the programs which are now undertaken and the various contracts that the Office of Coal Research has engaged in, will make a major contribution which would encourage a greater use of coal in many areas of the country.

Mr. WHARTON. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MOORE. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.

CIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PRICE). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ARENDS] is recognized for 20 minutes.

(Mr. ARENDS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important agencies of our Government, particularly during this period of international uncertainties and anxieties, is our Central Intelligence Agency.

The time has long since arrived when someone should take cognizance of the baseless criticism that has been and continues to be heaped upon it. That is my purpose here today, as a member of the CIA Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services since its establishment. I do not purport to speak as an authority on all the functions and activities of the CIA. But I do presume to speak with some factual knowledge about the CIA as an organization and how it functions.

I do not mean to imply that the CIA should be above criticism. No agency of Government should be above criticism. Constructive criticism makes for improvement, and there is always room for improvement.

But much of the criticism directed at the CIA is not constructive. It cannot possibly be, as it is not based on facts. It is based on half-truths and distortions. Indeed, some of it constitutes complete untruths, with no foundation whatever in fact or in reason. This is what concerns me. Something once said, however false, is readily oft-repeated and in time is accepted as a fact although an outright falsehood. And we know there are those who would, if they could, discredit the CIA. Others of us, having no such intention, unwittingly become their victims.

Let me present one illustration. I refer to the much publicized, much discussed case of the Polish defector, Michal Goleniewski. I refer to the irresponsible series of articles concerning the CIA that has been recently published in the New York Journal American.

Among these wild accusations is that the CIA has attempted to prevent Michal Goleniewski from appearing before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. They go so far as to charge that the CIA has quashed subpoenas. That simply is not true. A simple telephone call to the chairman of that subcommittee would have brought forth the information that going back to last August, when the first subpoena was served on this man, the executive branch of the Government has been cooperative with the Senate subcommittee throughout.

Contrary to what has been reported in the press, the postponements of Michal Goleniewski's appearance before the Senate subcommittee were at the request of the man himself. And the subcommittee agreed to his request.

I might add that the CIA subcommittee, of which I am a member, went into every aspect of this case. I am personally satisfied that the publicized statements purported to come from Michal Goleniewski are not correct. The information as reported in the press is not in agreement with the information Michal Goleniewski has made available to many departments of Government.

Stories such as have been circulated on this case display a reckless regard of the truth. They can be harmful, and those who circulate them do a great disservice to maintaining public confidence in the CIA.

Before commenting further with respect to the CIA and unfounded criticisms of it, perhaps I should first take cognizance of the criticism of the CIA Subcommittee, of which I am a member. It is quite understandable that some Members of Congress might feel we are not as well acquainted with the operations of the CIA as we should be. No one, except members of the subcommittee itself, has any knowledge of just how extensively and intensively we inquire into the activities of this intelligence agency. We hold no public hearings. We issue no reports. We cannot do otherwise and preserve the effectiveness of the CIA as a secret fact-gathering agency on an international scale. We can only hope that the House has sufficient confidence in our subcommittee, as individuals and as a committee, to accept

our assurances that we are kept well informed and we have no hesitancy of keeping a close eye and ear on CIA operations.

I was very much distressed to read an article in Esquire magazine, written by a distinguished Member of Congress—one of the best and one of my good friends—in which he says:

The members of four subcommittees themselves, by definition, have relatively low status.

Not because I am a member of one of those subcommittees, but for the other members of our Armed Services Subcommittee on CIA, I must take exception to the implication of that statement as to their status.

The membership of our subcommittee is comprised of the distinguished chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON]; the distinguished ranking majority member, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS]; and another distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT]. Serving with them are the other very distinguished members: The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PRICE], the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BRAY], the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT], the gentleman from California [Mr. WILSON], the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HUBLESTON], and the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. OSMERS].

I am not at liberty to announce the members of the other subcommittees in the Congress dealing with CIA matters; but I can assure the House they are not "by definition, of relatively low status."

The article to which I refer goes on to state:

But even had those subcommittees both status and time, the difficulties involved in dividing jurisdiction among the four would, I think, be insuperable.

This point deserves analysis. Since the proposed solution to the matter of low status and little time would be to establish a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence, several questions arise.

In addition to CIA, there are other intelligence activities which are component parts of the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. I do not believe that the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Armed Services Committee or the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy would be likely to relinquish their responsibilities for legislative oversight of the components of those departments which are presently under their jurisdiction. We would thus be establishing a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence that would, in fact, be superimposed on the existing committees and subcommittees. This brief analysis does not begin to delve into the jurisdictional problems that would thus be raised within the congressional committee structure and the Congress itself.

In the same Esquire article it is asserted in connection with the Bay of Pigs situation, and I now quote, "Not only was CIA shaping policy—perhaps understandable because of the absence